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ORWELL VERSUS HUXLEY: ECONOMICS,
TECHNOLOGY, PRIVACY, AND SATIRE
RICHARD A. POSNER*
Abstract
Orwell’s novel Nineteen Eighty-Four and Huxley’s novel
Brave New World have often been thought p r o p h e t i c
commentaries on economic, political, and social matters. I
argue, with particular reference
to the supposed
applicability of these novels to issues of technology and
privacy, that the novels are best understood as literary works
of art, rather than as social science or commentary, and that
when so viewed Orwell’s novel in particular reflects a
dissatisfaction with everyday life and a nostalgia f o r
Romantic values.
The organizers of this conference have asked me to discuss
what Nineteen Eighty-Four may have bequeathed to us in the way of
useful thinking about technology and privacy. Many people believe
that the relentless advance of science and technology in recent
decades has endangered privacy and brought us to the very brink
of the Orwellian nightmare. With the organizers’ permission I have
enlarged my canvas to take in another famous English satiric novel
from the era that produced Nineteen Eighty-Four. Aldous Huxley’s
Brave New World, published in 1932, has many parallels to Orwell’s
novel, published in 1949—and Orwell borrowed extensively from
the earlier work (as both works did from Yevgeny Zamyatin’s novel
We [1924])—yet it is far more technology-intensive and in ways that
bring out the limitations of Orwell’s vision. Indeed, the contrast
between these two celebrated dystopic novels, notably in their ideas
about the relation between sex and privacy, is striking. But relating
* Chief Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer,
University of Chicago Law School. This is the amplified text of a talk given at a
University of Chicago Law School conference on “1984: Orwell and Our
Future” on November 12, 1999. I thank Paul Choi for his helpful research
assistance and Larry Downes, Joseph Epstein, Lawrence Lessig, Charlene
Posner, Eric Posner, Richard Rorty, and Richard Stern for their helpful
comments on a previous draft.
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the two works to technology is no easy matter, and I need two
mediating approaches: that of economics, in relation to
technology, and that of literary criticism, in relation to satire, which
is the genre of both novels, although I shall argue that Orwell’s
novel is not only a satire.
To telegraph my punch, I don’t think either novel has much to
teach us about what it means to live in an age of technology,
though both are fine novels. They don’t have a lot to say about
privacy either, although what they do say about it is important—in
particular, that a taste for solitude is inimical to totalizing schemes
of governance and social organization, whether the utilitarianism of
Brave New World or the totalitarianism of Nineteen Eighty-Four,
because when people are alone they are more apt to have wayward
thoughts about their community than when they are immersed in
it.1 This is not a new idea; it lies behind Jeremy Bentham’s proposal
for the “Panopticon,” a domed prison the cells of which would have
no ceilings so that the prisoners could be kept under continuous
observation by warders stationed at the top of the dome. Privacy
and technology are related in Orwell’s novel through the
“telescreen,” a means of universal surveillance. They are largely
separate in Huxley’s novel, except insofar as reproductive
technology is related to privacy.
I do not mean to rest with making negative points. I shall try to
explain what in my view these novels are most importantly about
and where they succeed and where they fail. I shall suggest2 that it is
a mistake to try to mine works of literature for political or
economic significance—even when it is political literature.

1

“To do anything that suggested a taste for solitude, even to go for a walk by
yourself, was always slightly dangerous. There was a word for it in Newspeak:
ownlife, it was called, meaning individualism and eccentricity.” George Orwell,
Nineteen Eighty-Four 70 (1949). All my quotations are from the 1961
paperback edition published by New American Library under the title 1984
(the date was spelled out in the original edition). Subsequent page references
to Orwell’s novel appear in the text of this paper.
2 As I have done elsewhere: see my essays “Against Ethical Criticism,” 21
Philosophy and Literature 1 (1997); “Against Ethical Criticism: Part Two,” 22
Philosophy and Literature 416 (1998).
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I. SOME ECONOMICS OF TECHNOLOGY
I imagine that anyone who thinks that these two novels—both
in their different ways distinctly dystopic, if not downright
dyspeptic—are commentaries on technology thinks they are critical
commentaries. Economics can provide focus, structure, and
critique to the widespread fear that technology is a danger to man
as well as a boon—indeed a master as well as a servant, so that
technological “progress” may be, at the same time and perhaps
more fundamentally, retrogressive from the standpoint of
civilization. There are five ways in which the economist can help us
to see the downside of technological change.3 I shall call them
externality, marginality, rent seeking, interaction effects, and
economies of scale and scope.
A new technology will be brought to market by a profitmaximizing firm if the output embodying it (for example,
automobiles equipped with power steering) can be sold at a price
that will equal or exceed its cost to the seller. Under conditions of
competition, the firm will expand its output of the product
embodying the technology until marginal cost (the cost of
expanding output by a small amount) just equals price. Since
consumers will not buy a product unless they think it will make
them better off, the ability of the technology to win its way in the
market in the way just described is prima facie evidence that the
technology is a “good thing.”
But it is only prima facie evidence. One thing that can rebut
the prima facie case is that the seller may not take the full costs of
the new technology into account, in which event technology may
be introduced even though its net social benefits are negative. As
economists say, some of the costs may be external to his decisionmaking process. A transcontinental supersonic airline service would
reduce travel times, but it would also generate sonic booms,
annoying people, and breaking windows, beneath the flight path.
3

This is not the usual focus of economic analysis of technology. The usual
focus is on the relation between science and technology (the former being a
major input into the latter), the different incentive structures of the two
activities, the social benefits of technological progress, and the means (such
as patent rights) for encouraging private individuals and firms to produce
these benefits. See, for an excellent discussion, Partha Dasgupta and Paul A.
David, “Information Disclosure and the Economics of Technology,” in Arrow
and the Ascent of Modern Economic Theory 519 (George R. Feiwel ed. 1987).
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These harms would be a cost of supersonic travel, but not a cost
borne by the airline unless the law made the airline liable for it.
External effects can be positive as well as negative, however, and on
balance the external effects of modern technology have been
positive. The positive effects stem largely from the fact that most
technological innovations are imitable and patent laws provide only
very limited protection against imitation. The benefits to consumers
of most technologically advanced products, ranging from
pharmaceuticals to color television, greatly exceed the profits of
the manufacturers.
I said that the level of output in a competitive market is
determined by the intersection of price and marginal cost. This
implies that the marginal purchaser—the purchaser willing to pay a
price no higher than marginal cost—drives the market to a
considerable extent. It follows that a technological innovation that
is attractive to the marginal consumer may be introduced even
though it lowers consumer welfare overall; this is a kind of negative
externality.4
4

Suppose an airline has to decide whether to reconfigure its aircraft in a way
that will provide very cramped seating at a lower price than with its existing,
roomier seating. Let us suppose that with the cramped seating the plane can
carry 300 passengers each paying $100, so that the total revenue per flight will
be $30,000, while with roomier seating it can carry only 250 passengers each
paying $110, for a total revenue of $27,500. So, assuming (as I will) that the
cost of operating the plane is the same, the airline will switch to the crampedseating configuration. But there may well be an overall social loss. The extra
50 passengers are marginal in the sense of not being willing to pay very much
for airline travel; let us assume that the most they would pay would be $101 a
ticket, so their net welfare is enhanced by a total of only $50 as a result of the
new configuration. Of the other 250 passengers, let me assume that 200 are
indifferent between the lower price and the reduced comfort, so they neither
gain nor lose by the change. But now suppose that the remaining 50
passengers value roomy seating very highly; they would be willing to pay $150
for it. The airline will not charge that much, however, for if it did the flight
would attract only 50 passengers and the airline’s total revenue for the flight
would be only $7,500. In other words, the inframarginal consumers cannot
compensate the airline for the cost to it of the roomier seating, and so,
notwithstanding their strong preference for such seating, the airline will switch
to the cramped configuration. As a result, 50 passengers will have lost a total
of $2,000 in the value they derived from flying (50 x $150 – $110), the
difference between what they did pay and what they would be willing to pay for
the flight with the roomier seating, while gaining only $500 (50 x $10) in lower
price. The net loss to them is $1,500 and exceeds the net gain to the “winners”
from the change ($50).
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Rent seeking refers to the fact that economic activity is
generally guided by the prospects for private gain rather than the
prospects for social gain. As a result, costs may be incurred that do
not increase society’s overall wealth but merely alter its distribution
among persons. The principal effect of a firm’s spending heavily on
an advertising campaign may be to get business away from a rival
who may respond with his own advertising expenditures. Consumer
welfare may be higher as a result of the information or
entertainment value of the additional advertising, but it may not be
higher by an amount equal to or greater than the full amount of
the two firm’s expenditures. Many technological innovations raise
costs without increasing net social benefits. This is particularly true
of innovations relating to internal and external security. A more
lethal gun has value both to criminals and to the police, but after
both sides in the war against crime are equipped with it, the only
effect of the innovation may be to increase the costs of crime and
crime control. Likewise, but on a much larger scale, with military
weapons. The “arms race” is indeed the classic example of wasteful
competition. Both crime and conquest are close to being purely
rent-seeking activities. The costs incurred in trying to obtain a
competitive advantage by adopting a new technology are entirely
wasted from the standpoint of overall social welfare except to the
extent that the technology can be beneficially adapted to civilian
use—a spillover analogous to the informational or entertainment
quality of advertising designed purely to wrest business from a
competitor.
Technological innovations also can interact with each other or
with the social structure to produce unforeseeable long-run
consequences that may be good or bad, a possibility dramatized by
World War I, which revealed the unexpected destructiveness of
This problem with pricing equal to marginal cost can be and is alleviated
to a considerable extent by the widespread practice of price discrimination in
the airline industry. The airlines try as far as possible to vary prices according
to each individual consumer’s willingness to pay, and they also divide each
aircraft into classes (first class, business class, and coach) that allow for
different levels of comfort. The principle that pricing equal to marginal cost
may not produce a social optimum is not affected by efforts to alleviate the
problem, since they cannot be assumed always to solve it completely; but the
airline case is a good example of how market forces themselves operate to
limit market failures.

6

Orwell versus Huxley

warfare under conditions of technological progress. The problem
of technology’s unanticipated consequences, the subject of a vast
literature in history, sociology, and cultural studies,5 is merely the
problem of externalities writ large. For I am speaking now of
external effects that cannot be predicted; often they cannot be
evaluated even after they have come to pass. Consider such
innovations of the last half century as improved contraceptive and
labor-saving devices, fast food, and the automation of many tasks
formerly requiring substantial upper-body strength. Their
interaction probably is largely responsible for women’s
emancipation from their formerly constrained role in society, an
emancipation that has brought in its train a high divorce rate, a low
marriage rate and high age of first marriage, a high rate of
abortions and of births out of wedlock, a low birth rate, an increase
in fertility problems that has contributed in turn to an increased
rate of innovation in reproductive technology, and a profound
change in sexual morality, including increased tolerance of
homosexuality. None of these consequences of the technological
innovations that I have listed was foreseen, and the net impact on
social welfare is unclear, or at least unmeasurable, though I am
inclined to think it positive. Other unintended consequences of
technological progress include the effect of life-extending medical
technology on the costs of Medicare and social security, and the
effect of automation and computerization on income equality: the
effect has been to increase inequality by increasing the demand for
highly educated workers relative to manual workers. These are
modern examples, but the problem that they illustrate that they
illustrate is very old.6
The four reasons that I have discussed thus far for uncertainty
about whether technological innovation will increase or reduce
social welfare can help us understand the sense that many people
have that scientific and technological progress is “out of control”
and leading us into a future that may not be a net improvement on
5

See The Intellectual Appropriation of Technology:
Modernity, 1900–1939 (Mikael Hård and Andrew Jamison
references cited there.
6 See, for example, the fascinating story of the effect of the
stirrup on medieval society in Lynn White, Jr., Medieval
Social Change, ch. 1 (1962).

Discourses o n
eds. 1998), and
invention of the
Technology and
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the present. Those of us who have lived most of our lives in the
second half of the twentieth century are likely to be optimistic
rather than pessimistic about where technology is leading, but
perhaps only because technology has been on the whole very good
to us. I can remember life in the late 1940s and early 1950s well
enough to attest that scientific and technological progress since
then has made life a good deal safer, healthier, more comfortable,
and more enjoyable, though of course not for everyone even in this
society. But the economics of technological innovation that I have
been sketching suggests the need for caution about projecting the
beneficent trends of the recent past into the future.
None of the specific concerns so far discussed figures in either
novel. What worried the authors was that technology, and
“technocratic” methods and attitudes more generally, might
conduce to supplanting economic competition (the market) and
political competition (democracy). Our authors believed, like many
of their contemporaries, that engineering methods, applied both to
production and to people (“social engineering”), epitomized
rationality, entailed central planning and centralized control, were
much more efficient than the market, and implied political as well
as economic rule by experts. In economic lingo, the concern was
that technology was bringing about radically increased economies
of scale and scope—was making the efficient size and scope of
enterprises so large that eventually all activity would be conducted
on a monopoly basis.
The relation between monopoly and technology is
complicated. If technological innovation is risky, too little of it may
be undertaken if competitors can appropriate the benefits of the
innovation. This is the rationale of patent protection, which is a
form of monopoly. So technology may “invite” monopoly and at the
same time may lower its costs, perhaps by reducing the cost of
control. Computers were once expected to facilitate central
planning of an economy; recently they have been effective in
reducing middle management, and thus reducing the costs of
internal control of enterprises and so presumably increasing the
span of effective control and thus the optimum size of enterprises.
But equally technology can foster decentralization, for example by
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reducing transaction costs among independent firms.7 Another
possibility is that new (hence small) firms may be better at
technological innovation,8 in which event technological progress
will favor small firms over large, competition over monopoly. It is an
empirical rather than a theoretical question whether technological
progress on balance favors monopoly or competition. As of now it
appears, contrary to widespread fears in the 1930s and 1940s, not
only that competition generally is a more efficient method of
organizing production than central planning but also that the more
technologically advanced the economy, the greater the advantage
of competition.
Nor has technological progress imperiled democracy; rather
the opposite. Technological progress has increased average
incomes in most nations, and income not only is strongly positively
correlated with political freedom but also appears to play a causal
role in that freedom.9 We should consider, however, the possibility
that technology may threaten that freedom through its effect on
privacy. Consider the two principal aspects of privacy when it is
distinguished from autonomy, for which “privacy” has become a
common synonym in constitutional law, where rights of sexual and
reproductive freedom are described as aspects of the “right of
privacy.” The two nonautonomous aspects of privacy are solitude
and secrecy, and to a totalitarian regime the social costs of both are
great. Solitude (not complete isolation, but enough private space to
enable a person to think for himself) fosters individualistic attitudes;
conversely, the constant presence of other people, or sense of
being under constant surveillance, enforces decorum and
conformity. Secrecy, in the sense of concealment of what one is
thinking, or writing, or saying to friends or other intimates, enables
subversive thinking and planning to be hidden from the authorities.
Indeed, planning implies communication, and serious independent
thinking is hardly possible without having someone to “bounce
ideas” off, but the communication of “dangerous” thoughts is itself
7

This effect is emphasized in Larry Downes and Chunka Mui, Unleashing t h e
Killer App: Digital Strategies for Market Dominance (1998).
8 As argued in Clayton M. Christensen, The Innovator’s Dilemma: When N e w
Technologies Cause Great Firms to Fail (1997).
9 Richard A. Posner, “Equality, Wealth, and Political Stability,” 13 Journal o f
Law, Economics, and Organization 344 (1997).
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dangerous if there is no privacy of communication. So solitude
creates the elementary conditions for independent thought, and
concealment creates the essential conditions for the refinement
and propagation of that thought. In both Brave New World and
Nineteen Eighty-Four, the high social costs of privacy to the regime,
conjoined with technological advances that make it costly to
maintain privacy, result in dramatically less privacy compared to
that of our society.
Each of these aspects of privacy can be regarded as an
economic good, and its demand and supply conditions investigated.
Both, though solitude particularly, are superior goods in the
economic sense of the term: the demand for them grows with
increases in income. The supply price varies with a host of
economic factors, such as the price of land; the higher that price is,
the higher the cost of privacy as solitude. In the case of privacy as
secrecy, the supply price has risen with the rapid expansion in
computerized data storage and retrieval and especially the rise of
the internet; it is increasingly costly to conceal any information that
is in a record, whether a medical record, purchasing records
(including subscription information), or title documents. To put
this differently, the cost of invading privacy has fallen with the
“information revolution”—now the “cyberspace revolution.”10 (We
shall see this when we see how labor intensive the means of
surveillance employed in Nineteen Eighty-Four are.) Yet it is unlikely
that the net amount of privacy has declined, since it is a superior
good; and it is certain that people today are better informed, more
individualistic, and more self-assertive than they were in Huxley’s
and Orwell’s time—which is what we would expect if privacy had,
on balance, grown.
An even more important point is that privacy as secrecy is not
an unalloyed good. Charismatic political leadership—the most
dangerous kind—depends on the leader’s ability to control public
information about him. If he loses that ability—if he loses his
“privacy”—his mystique, and with it his power, erodes. The same
technological advances that have made it costly for private persons
to protect their privacy have, by making government more
transparent, made it more costly for public officials to conceal bad
10

See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Code—and Other Laws of C y b e r s p a c e
142–156 (1999).
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acts—including snooping into the private affairs of the citizenry.
Secrecy, in short, is a bad as well as a good, and so the net effect on
social welfare of making secrecy more costly to maintain is difficult
to assess.
I anticipate the argument that in examining issues of
technology and privacy from the standpoint of economics, I am
instantiating the problem rather than analyzing it. Modern
economics is itself a form of “technocratic” thought closely allied to
such clearly technocratic fields as statistics, engineering, computer
science, and operations research. Max Weber would have thought
that modern economic thinking, especially when it is applied to
noneconomic behavior, as I have done in many of my writings, is a
prime example of the triumph of the trend, which he thought
defined modernity, toward bringing more and more areas of
human life and thought under the reign of rational methods. This
theory, which as we’ll see influenced both Huxley and (under the
rubric of “managerialism”) Orwell, is indeed worth considering in a
discussion of the relation of Brave New World and Nineteen EightyFour to issues of technology, and I shall do so. Specifically, I shall
argue that the disenchantment of the world which Weber
predicted as a byproduct of the triumph of rational methods
appears in Orwell’s novel as a nostalgia for Romantic values. We
might think of this as a spiritual consequence of technology and
technocracy that is apart from the economic and political
consequences that I have been discussing and that are often though
I think erroneously considered the heart of the novels’ critique of
modernity.
II. SATIRE
We need to think about the genre, satire,11 to which both
novels belong, though Brave New World more obviously. Satire is a
genre of fiction that invites the reader’s attention to the flaws in his
society, or in society (or humanity) more generally. Often, as in
such classics of the genre as Gulliver’s Travels, it is set in a fantastic
world, seemingly remote in time, place, or culture from the satirist’s
(and reader’s) world. This point is directly applicable to both Brave
New World and Nineteen Eighty-Four. The fact that they are set in
11 Superbly discussed in Alvin Kernan, The Cankered Muse: Satire of t h e
English Renaissance, ch. 1 (1959).
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the future (600 years and 35 years, respectively) need not imply that
they are efforts at prophecy, rather than critiques of, or warnings
against, tendencies visible in the writer’s own society. In both novels,
as we shall see, futuristic technology is a straightforward
extrapolation from well-known technologies of the author’s day.
It is also characteristic of satire that there is a satirist character
in the work—a denouncer of the flaws to which the author wishes
to invite the reader’s attention but not necessarily identical to the
author. Often he is a gloomier, shriller figure than the author, and
sometimes he embodies many of the flaws that he denounces. Brave
New World has two main satirist characters—the Savage, who like
Gulliver is an outsider to the “world” that is being satirized, and
Bernard Marx, the insider, a classic satiric misfit.12 In Nineteen
Eighty-Four the satiric character is also an insider, Winston Smith,
who, being like Bernard something of a misfit13 and also like
Bernard (and relatedly) having the taste for solitude that both
authors deem the precondition for independent thinking, is able to
see through the lies that undergird his society and is thus able to
denounce it. The satire figures in both novels come to a bad
end—death, “unpersonhood,” or, in the case of Bernard Marx,
exile to Iceland—which is also typical of the genre. Likewise the fact
that both provide an anchor to the real world of the present by
dwelling on certain familiar objects, such as the Savage’s copy of
Shakespeare’s complete works, or, in Orwell’s novel, the
paperweight, thrush, statue of Oliver Cromwell, real coffee, silverfoil-wrapped chocolate, and other objects left over from before the
Revolution. Characters in satires tend to be cardboard figures,
“humors” rather than three-dimensional human beings. Winston
and Julia, in Nineteen Eighty-Four, are the only richly human
characters in either novel, and some doubt that even they are that.
12

Marx is bitter, marginal, excessively intelligent, insecure, timid, boastful,
and socially inept—all apparently stemming from his being short. “‘They say
somebody made a mistake when he was still in the bottle—thought he was a
Gamma and put alcohol into his blood-surrogate. That’s why he’s so
stunted.’” Aldous Huxley, Brave New World 46 (1932). (All my quotations are
from the 1998 HarperCollins Perennial Classics edition, and subsequent page
references to it appear in the text.) He is probably meant to remind the reader
of a Jew, though there are no Jews in the society depicted in the novel.
Winston Smith is physically challenged as well, as we shall see.
13 Though, in keeping with the quite different tone of Orwell’s novel, he is not
ridiculous, as Bernard becomes.
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Satire tends, finally, to be topical. This makes it perilous to try to
understand a satire without some knowledge of social conditions in
the time and place in which it was written. Satire is akin to parody,
and to understand a parody you have to understand the conditions
being parodied, which are usually those of the satirist-parodist’s
own society. To understand Swift’s A Modest Proposal, you have to
understand eighteenth-century English attitudes toward both
cannibalism and the Irish.
Simply identifying the genre of the two novels that I am
examining is helpful in dispelling common misunderstandings about
them: that the authors were trying to predict the future, that they
were pessimists (as they would have to be regarded if they thought
they were predicting the future), and that Huxley identifies with the
Savage (or, less plausibly, Bernard) and Orwell with Winston Smith.
To write in a particular genre is to adopt the conventions of that
genre, and this need not reveal anything of the character,
emotions, or even beliefs of the author. Of course, from all we
know about Orwell it is obvious that Nineteen Eighty-Four is a
warning about communism, specifically its Stalinist variant.14 But
that is not necessarily the most important thing that it is; among
other things he was warning us about tendencies that he believed
latent in capitalism.
III. B RAVE N EW W ORLD
Huxley’s novel is much more high-tech than Orwell’s. This is
not surprising; Huxley came from a distinguished scientific family
and studied to be a doctor, whereas Orwell had no familial or
educational background in science. Futuristic technology is a
pervasive feature of the society depicted in Brave New World and is
meticulously described and explained. It is of three types. The first
is reproductive technology. Contraception has been made
foolproof yet does not interfere with sexual pleasure. So sex has
14

Though it can be argued, from the meeting in O’Brien’s apartment at
which the tactics of the “Brotherhood” (led by Emmanuel Goldstein, the
Trotsky figure) are laid out and Winston pledges his willingness to throw
sulfuric acid in a child’s face if that will advance the Brotherhood’s cause, that
Orwell believed that a Trotskyite version of communism would have been no
better than the Stalinist. It is merely arguable, because it is uncertain whether
the Brotherhood or Goldstein actually exists. Goldstein is probably no more a
real person than Big Brother is.
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been separated reliably from procreation at last and, at the same
time, procreation has been separated from sex. Ova extracted from
ovaries are mixed in the laboratory with sperm, and the fertilized
ova are brought to term in incubators. The procedure has enabled
the perfection of eugenic breeding, yielding five genetically
differentiated castes, ranging from high-IQ Alphas to moronic
Epsilons, to enable a perfect matching of genetic endowment with
society’s task needs.15
Second is mind- and body-altering technology, including
hypnopaedia (hypnosis during sleep), Pavlovian conditioning,
elaborate cosmetic surgery, and happiness pills (soma, similar to
our Prozac, but nonprescription and taken continually by
everyone). For the elderly, there are “gonadal hormones” and
“transfusion of young blood” (p. 54). Third is happiness-inducing
entertainment technology, including television, synthetic music,
movies that gratify the five senses (the “Feelies”), and, for the
Alphas, personal helicopters for vacations.
These technological advances are represented as having
profound effects. They induce mindless contentment, including
guiltless promiscuous sex. They induce complete intellectual and
cultural vacuity, and complete political passivity. Marriage, the
family, and parenthood—all conceived of as sources of misery,
tension, and painful strong emotions—have gone by the board. But
none of these consequences is presented as an unintended
consequence of technological innovation, which is our fear of
technology and a fear that the economics of technology suggests
some rational basis for. Technology in Brave New World is the slave
of a utilitarian ideology. Above everything else, Huxley’s novel is a
send-up of utilitarianism. “The higher castes… [must not] lose their
faith in happiness as the Sovereign Good and take to believing,
instead, that the goal was somewhere beyond, somewhere outside
the present human sphere; that the purpose of life was not the
maintenance of well-being, but some intensification and refining of
consciousness, some enlargement of knowledge” (p. 177).
Technology has enabled the creation of the utilitarian paradise, in
which happiness is maximized, albeit at the cost of everything that
15

“We decant our babies as socialized human beings, as Alphas or Epsilons,
as sewage workers or future…Directors of Hatcheries” (p. 13).
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makes human beings interesting.16 The Savage is unhappy but vital;
the “civilized” people are fatuous, empty. The role of technology is
to create the conditions in which a tiny elite can combine complete
control over social, political, and economic life with the
achievement of material abundance. This is an echo of the 1930s
belief in the efficacy of central planning.
The topicality of satire, well illustrated in Huxley’s novel by the
caste system that is obviously a satiric commentary on the English
class system and by the exhibiting of the Savage and his mother to
the shocked Londoners as exotic specimens of New World savagery
(though the two of them are in fact English), invites us to consider
conditions in England when Brave New World was written. It was in
the depths of a world depression that Keynes was teaching had
resulted from insufficient consumer demand and could be cured
only by aggressive government intervention. Capitalism was believed
to have failed, for lack of sufficient coordination or rationalization,
resulting in excessive, destructive competition. Capitalism
(competition, the “free market”) was not merely unjust; it was
inefficient. There was also great anxiety about falling birth rates
and the quality of the genetic pool.
All these concerns are mirrored in Brave New World. One of
the salient features of the society depicted in it is consumerism,
which encompasses planned obsolescence and a “throwaway”
mentality (“ending is better than mending” [p. 49]). People are
brainwashed to want ever more, ever newer consumer goods, lest
consumer demand flag. This is an example of how everything is
planned and directed, down to the smallest detail of culture,
technology, and consumption, from the center. And eugenic
breeding solves the population and gene-pool problems. The
society of Brave New World is the “logical” outcome of reform
measures advocated by advanced thinkers in England and other
countries during the depression. Developing the logic of an existing
social system to an absurd or repulsive extreme (Huxley appears to
have thought it the latter, not doubting its feasibility) is a typical
technique of satire; we shall see it at work in Nineteen Eighty-Four
as well.
16

“‘Yes, everybody’s happy now,’ echoed Lenina. They had heard the words
repeated a hundred and fifty times every night for twelve years” (when they
were children) (p. 75).
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Without technology, the “solution” that Huxley limns to 1930stype problems would not be workable. But the technology plays a
supporting rather than initiating role. It is the tool of a
philosophical and economic vision. There is no sense that
technology has merely evolved, unplanned, to a level that makes the
regimented, trivial society depicted in the novel likely, let alone
inevitable. There is no law of unintended consequences operating.
Technology enables but does not dictate.
What makes Brave New World still a good “read” today is
mainly the fact that so many of its predictions of futuristic
technology and morality have come or are rapidly coming to pass.
Sex has been made largely safe for pleasure by the invention of
methods of contraception that at once are reliable and do not
interfere with the pleasure of sex, while, as I noted earlier, a variety
of other technological advances, ranging from better care of
pregnant women and of infants to household labor-saving devices
and advances in the medical treatment of infertility and the
automation of the workplace, have (along with the contraceptive
advances, and safe abortion on demand) freed women from the
traditional restrictions on their sexual freedom.17 The result is a
climate of sexual freedom, and of public obsession with sex and
sexual pleasure, much like that depicted in Huxley’s novel, though
“mother” is not yet a dirty word as it literally is in the novel and
marriage has not yet been abolished, though the marriage rate has
fallen considerably.
The society of happy thoughtless philistines depicted by Huxley
will strike some readers as exaggeration rather than distortion of
today’s America. “‘The world’s stable now. People are happy; they
get what they want, and they never want what they can’t get.
They’re well off; they’re safe; they’re never ill; they’re not afraid of
death; they’re blissfully ignorant of passion and old age; they’re
plagued with no mothers or fathers; they’ve got no wives, or
children, or lovers to feel strongly about; they’re so conditioned
17

“In some areas, despite its being a dystopia, Brave New World offers women
a better deal than the contemporary British society of the 1930s. There is no
housework, no wifely subjugation, no need to balance children and a career.”
June Deery, “Technology and Gender in Aldous Huxley’s Alternative (?)
Worlds,” in Critical Essays on Aldous Huxley 103, 105 (Jerome Meckier ed.
1996).
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that they practically can’t help behaving as they ought to behave.
And if anything should go wrong, there’s soma’” (p. 220). We too
are awash in happiness pills, of both the legal and illegal variety,
augmented by increasingly ambitious cosmetic surgery to make us
happier about our appearance. We are enveloped by
entertainment technology to a degree that even Huxley could not
imagine; in our society too “cleanliness is next to fordliness” (p.
110). We have a horror of physical aging and even cultivate
infantilism—adults dressing and talking like children. “Alphas are so
conditioned that they do not have to be infantile in their emotional
behaviour. But that is all the more reason for their making a special
effort to conform. It is their duty to be infantile, even against their
inclination” (p. 98). We live in the present; our slogan, too, might
be, “Never put off till to-morrow the fun you can have today” (p.
93). Popular culture has everywhere triumphed over high culture;
the past has been largely forgotten. We consider it our duty as well
as our right to pursue happiness right to the edge of the grave. In
the “Park Lane Hospital for the Dying…we try to create a
thoroughly pleasant atmosphere…, something between a first-class
hotel and a feely-palace” (pp. 198–199). Our culture is saturated
with sex. Shopping is the national pastime. Although Americans are
not entirely passive politically, we are largely content with the status
quo, we are largely free from envy and resentment, the major
political parties are copies of each other, and a 1930s style
depression seems unimaginable to most of us. Depression in both its
senses is becoming unimaginable.
We may even be moving, albeit slowly, toward a greater genetic
differentiation of classes, although not by the mechanism depicted
in Brave New World—yet that mechanism will soon be feasible.
With the decline of arranged marriage and the breaking down of
taboos against interracial, interethnic, and religiously mixed
marriage, prospective marriage partners can be expected to be
sorted more by “real” similarities, including intelligence.18 IQ has a
significant heritable component, so the implication of more perfect
assortative mating is that the IQ distribution will widen in future
generations.
18

On the tendency to “assortative” mating—likes mating with likes—see Gary
S. Becker, A Treatise on the Family, ch. 4 (enlarged ed. 1991).
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But all this has come (or is coming) about without foresight or
direction, contrary to the implication of Huxley’s novel. It turns out
that a society can attain “Fordism”19—the rationalization, the
systematization, of production that was originally symbolized by the
assembly line—without centralization. Huxley was mistaken to
equate efficiency with collectivization.20 Our society has no
utilitarian master plan and no utilitarian master planner. There is
nothing corresponding to Brave New World’s “Controllers,” the
successors to Dostoyevsky’s Grand Inquisitor: “Happiness is a hard
master—particularly other people’s happiness” (p. 227). And
despite its resemblance to Huxley’s dystopia, what we have seems to
most people, even the thinking people, rather closer to Utopia.
IV. N INETEEN E IGHTY -FOUR
By 1948, the year in which Orwell completed Nineteen EightyFour (he had begun writing it two years earlier), the depression of
the 1930s was over and concern with rationalizing production and
simulating consumption had diminished. The thought of politically
conscious people was dominated instead by vivid recent memories
of World War II and the menace of the Soviet Union, and these
gloomy, foreboding thoughts are everywhere reflected in the novel.
The dinginess of London in 1984 is recognizably the dinginess of
that city during and immediately after the war, a time of shortages,
rationing, and a prevailing grayness of life; and rocket bombs are
falling on London in 1984 just as they did in the last year of World
War II. The novel dwells obsessively on these features of life in
Orwell’s imagined dystopia, making a stark contrast with the
consumer’s heaven of Brave New World. Orwell depicted the
future London as he did less, I suspect, because he was prescient
about the incapacity of the Soviet economy, or of socialist central
planning in general, to bring about abundance—a loyal member of
the Labor Party to the end of his life, he never relinquished his
belief in democratic socialism—but because he was extremely
19

Henry Ford is the Karl Marx of the society depicted in Brave New World.
Instead of making the sign of the cross, the denizens of the world make a T,
which stands of course for Ford’s Model T.
20 His equation of them is well discussed in James Sexton, “Brave New World
and the Rationalization of Industry,” in Critical Essays on Aldous Huxley, note
15, at 88.
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sensitive to squalor, and to the sights and sounds and texture of
lower-class life in London. Orwell’s ambivalence about the lower
class (the “proles,” in Nineteen Eighty-Four), which he seems to
have found at once repulsive and appealing, is strongly marked.
The novel’s “take” on technology is a curious one. On the one
hand, the world of 1984 is presented21 as technologically
retrogressive, and this is explained by the fact that it is an oligopoly
of three perfected totalitarian “superstates,” Oceania, Eurasia, and
Eastasia, which have tacitly agreed to impose rigid thought control
on their populations, thus stifling the scientific and inventive spirit.
On the other hand, this development is inevitable because of
technology, which in the form of machine production enables an
almost effortless creation of wealth. (Shades of Huxley.) When
wealth is abundant, people cease to believe in the necessity of a
hierarchical society with marked inequalities. To stave off equality,
the ruling classes channel the “overproduction” enabled by
technology into warfare, which has the further advantage that in
times of war people are readier to submit to collective control. So
technology leads to totalitarianism, though by a more indirect
route than supposing that it simply fosters centralization at all levels
because of the greater efficiency of technocratic methods (which
Orwell also believed, however, as we are about to see).
Nineteen Eighty-Four is correct in suggesting that the
conditions of a totalitarian society, in particular its suppression of
freedom of thought, inquiry, and communication, are inimical to
scientific and technological progress. This (another reason, by the
way, to doubt that technology conduces to the elimination of
political freedom) is one of the lessons of the fall of
communism—we now know that much of the technological success
of the Soviet Union in the domain of weaponry, the only domain in
which it had such successes, was due to espionage. The other half of
the novel’s technology thesis, however, is clearly wrong; the great
increase in material wealth in the developed countries of the world
since Orwell wrote has produced both greater economic inequality
and greater political stability.
21

In The Theory and Practice of Oligarchic Collectivism—the treatise
ostensibly written by Emmanual Goldstein (the Trotsky figure in the novel),
but actually forged by the Inner Party—from which Winston reads a long
selection aloud to Julia shortly before they are arrested.
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The silliness of supposing that economic development leads to
the Orwellian nightmare is brought out in Erich Fromm’s afterword
to the 1961 edition of Nineteen Eighty-Four. Fromm attributes to
Orwell the view (with which Fromm makes clear that he agrees)
that “the danger [of the Orwellian nightmare] is inherent in the
modern mode of production and organization, and relatively
independent of the various ideologies [that is, capitalist and
communist]” (p. 267). But the attribution of this view to Orwell, or
more precisely to the implied author of Nineteen Eighty-Four, as it
is perilous to read off an author’s personal views from his
imaginative writings, seems approximately correct. (One clue is that
the currency of Oceania is the dollar, not the pound.) Among the
unmistakable sources of Orwell’s novel is the concept much touted
in his day of “managerialism,” which predicted incorrectly that
capitalism would evolve into a dirigiste, bureaucratized, centralized
economic system indistinguishable from Soviet communism.22 The
superior efficiency of competitive markets for coordinating
production was not widely understood.
The only technological innovation that figures largely in
Nineteen Eighty-Four is two-way television (the telescreen) by which
the securities services keep watch over the members of the Party,
though there is also reference to music and verse synthesizers. (The
technology is that of modern “videoconferencing.”) The telescreen
is a powerful metaphor for the loss of privacy in a totalitarian state.
But it is inessential to the political theme of the novel, which is the
feasibility of thought control through propaganda, education,
psychology (including behavioral modification), informers
(including children), censorship, lobotomizing, stirring up war
fever, terror, and, above all, the manipulation of historical records
and of language. The most interesting single feature of the novel is
Newspeak, a parody of Basic English, as well as of Nazi and Soviet
rhetoric, designed to make dangerous thoughts unthinkable by
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See, for example, James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution: What I s
Happening in the World (1941). Burnham’s prediction that World War II
(then in progress) would result in a division of the world into three
indistinguishable superstates, see, for example, id. at 264–265, is another of
Orwell’s conspicuous borrowings in the novel.
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eliminating the words for them.23 None of the instruments of
thought control described in the novel, except the telescreen and
possibly the lobotomizing-like machine that eliminates portions of
Winston’s memory, involves any technological advance over
Orwell’s time (as he emphasizes—it is, remember, part of his take
on technology). Indeed, all but the telescreen and the lobotomy
machine were in use in the Soviet Union of the 1930s and 1940s,
though in a less thoroughgoing form than in Orwell’s imagined
world. Nineteen Eighty-Four would be less vivid and suspenseful, but
not different in essentials, without any telescreens.
Because there is so little futurism in Orwell’s novel, he had no
reason to set it in the r e m o t e future; he was extrapolating only
modestly from contemporary conditions; one can imagine Soviet
leaders reading Nineteen Eighty-Four for ideas.24 Yet, oddly
enough, Huxley’s far-futuristic extravaganza comes closer to
describing our world. The reason is not that Huxley could foresee
the future (no one can) but that science is the story of our time,
and Huxley was genuinely interested in science and his interest is
reflected in his novel.25 Although Soviet-style brainwashing
undoubtedly had considerable effect on the minds of the people of
the communist countries,26 the rapidity and completeness with
which communism collapsed (today only Cuba and North Korea
23 For a comprehensive discussion, see John Wesley Young, Totalitarian
Language: Orwell’s Newspeak and Its Nazi and Communist Antecedents
(1991).
24 A defector from the Polish Communist Party claimed that members of the
“Inner Party,” who alone could easily obtain copies of Nineteen Eighty-Four,
were fascinated by Orwell’s “insight into details they knew well.” Czeslaw
Milosz, The Captive Mind 40 (1990).
25 A subordinate explanation of Huxley’s prescience is that until recently
there was a long lead time between scientific discovery and widespread
practical application. Helicopters, television, mind-altering drugs, eugenic
breeding, and large-screen color movies with wraparound sound and (if
desired) tactile and olfactory sensations were all known in the 1930s to be
technologically feasible, but it was decades before any of them became an
important part of our culture. For example, it wasn’t until the 1950s that
television, which had been developed in the 1930s, became a major factor in
American culture, and it was not till the 1960s that it became a major factor in
political campaigns. The longer the lead time between invention and
application, the easier it is to foresee the future technological condition of
society.
26 See Timur Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences o f
Preference Falsification, ch.13 (1995).
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are genuinely communist countries) demonstrated its ultimate
ineffectuality. The combination of techniques described in
Nineteen Eighty-Four seems frighteningly plausible, but this is a
tribute to Orwell’s artistic imagination. The system he describes is
not realistic.27 To see this, one need only ask who is to man all the
telescreens. There are several in every apartment and office
occupied by members of the Party—of whom there are a total of
about 45 million, for we are told that 15 percent of the population
belongs to the Party and that Oceania’s total population is 300
million—and it is implied that all the telescreens are manned.
Suppose there are 100 million telescreens; that would probably
require 10 million watchers.28 This is a clue to the element of
fantasy in the novel, which is important to an understanding of it as
literature.
Without the (infeasible) telescreen surveillance, the system of
thought control depicted by Orwell is essentially the Soviet system
under Stalin, which began eroding shortly after Stalin died,29 four
years after Nineteen Eighty-Four was published; even in the Stalin
era, the Party’s control of public opinion was spotty.30 Orwell may
have had an inkling of the fragility of thought control. Eighty-five
percent of the population of Oceania consists of the proles, who
are much like Huxley’s lower castes except that the proles’ stupidity
is not genetic—and, potentially, is redemptive. Having no “brains,”
the proles are immune to being brainwashed, as is Julia, who is not
“clever.”31 Most brainwashing is directed at Party members, and it is
only imperfectly successful; Winston and Julia, we discover late in
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Not a new point; see, for example, George Anastaplo, The American
Moralist: On Law, Ethics, and Government, ch. 13 (1992).
28 I am assuming two shifts, so that each watcher would be responsible for
monitoring 20 telescreens.
29 See, for example, Abbott Gleason, “‘Totalitarianism’ in 1984,” 43 Russian
Review 145 (1984).
30 “The normal posture of a Soviet citizen was passive conformity and outward
obedience. This did not mean, however, that Soviet citizens necessarily had a
high respect for authority. On the contrary, a degree of skepticism, even a
refusal to take the regime’s most serious pronouncements fully seriously, was
the norm.” Sheila Fitzpatrick, Everyday Stalinism: Ordinary Life in
Extraordinary Times: Soviet Russia in the 1930s 222 (1999).
31 Though Julia, like Winston, is broken by torture, the ultimate method of
control.
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the novel, are not the only imperfectly socialized Party members.32
Hence the large number of “vaporizings” (liquidations), though,
just as in Stalin’s Soviet Union, many of those liquidated are in fact
loyal Party members, notably the lexicographer Syme.
Most important, the Inner Party—the directing mechanism,
two percent of the population—necessarily comprises people who
see through the lies they are trying to foist on the rest of the society.
Like the rulers of the Soviet Union, the members of the Inner Party
have their own shops, which stock otherwise unobtainable luxury
goods of traditional bourgeois character. The novel denies,
however, that the fanaticism of the members of the Inner Party has
been undermined by comfort or hypocrisy, arguing that through
the mental technique of “doublethink” the members both know
and don’t know that their ideology is false. This was indeed a
characteristic of thought under communism,33 but the novel
exaggerates its effectiveness and tenacity.
Orwell seems to have realized that a system of thought control
will be unstable if major nations, knowledge of the conditions in
which cannot be wholly masked from the subject population,
remain outside the totalitarian sphere. The novel emphasizes that
there are no such nations in 1984. But this is not a plausible
equilibrium—another point of which Orwell may have had an
inkling because he notes that the three totalitarian superstates have
tacitly agreed to refrain from competing in military research.
Without such an agreement the totalitarian oligopoly would be
unstable because each superstate would have a compelling
incentive to seek a military advantage by relaxing its thought
control sufficiently to foster scientific and technological innovation.
We now know that liberal nations, like the United States, are, in the
long run, politically and militarily more formidable than
authoritarian or totalitarian ones, because they create much better
preconditions to rapid social and economic development, more
than offsetting the loss of centralized control and direction. A
32

Consider the egregious Parsons, a Party zealot turned in by his seven-yearold daughter who overhears him saying in his sleep, “Down with Big Brother!”
(p. 193). Maybe, though, his real sin is being proud of his daughter for
turning him in; it shows that he continues, contrary to Party doctrine, to
attach great importance to family.
33 Kuran, note 26 above, at 218.
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particular weakness of totalitarian states is the tendency to
“subjectivism,”34 the view much emphasized in Nineteen EightyFour that truth is what the Party or Leader says is true. This led to
such disastrous totalitarian misadventures as the Nazi rejection of
“Jewish physics” and the Soviet embrace of Lysenko’s crackpot
genetic theories.
The Orwellian nightmare is unstable in a second sense as well.
Neither Stalin nor Mao, the greatest practitioners of the kind of
thought control depicted in Orwell’s novel, was able to
institutionalize the system of thought control, which disintegrated
rapidly after their deaths. Their tyrannies were personal, while that
depicted in Nineteen Eighty-Four is collective. Big Brother is not a
living person, but a purely symbolic fabrication. The collective
leaderships that succeeded Stalin and Mao in their respective
nations were authoritarian, but they were unable to maintain the
degree of control that Stalin and Mao had achieved and that
Nineteen Eighty-Four parodies. Orwell does not explain how the
Party, and its counterpart in the other totalitarian superstates, have
managed this trick.
The political significance of Nineteen Eighty-Four, as of
Orwell’s earlier political satire, Animal Farm, is to depict with
riveting clarity the logic of totalitarianism—not its practice or its
prospects, but the carrying of its inner logic to extremes that are
sometimes almost comic, though darkly so. An example is the
sudden, retroactive substitution of Eastasia for Eurasia as Oceania’s
eternal enemy (an allusion, obviously, to the Nazi-Soviet pact of
1939) on the sixth day of Hate Week. An orator of the Inner Party is
handed a slip of paper in the middle of his speech, and without
missing a beat he completes the speech with “Eastasia” replacing
“Eurasia” wherever the latter name appears in his prepared text.
It is natural for intellectuals, even one like Orwell who was
contemptuous of intellectuals (“the more intelligent, the less sane”
(p. 177)),35 to exaggerate the efficacy of attempts at brainwashing,
34

For an excellent discussion, see George Watson, “Orwell’s Nazi Renegade,”
94 Sewanee Review 486 (1986).
35 “One has to belong to the intelligentsia to believe things like that: no
ordinary man could be such a fool.” George Orwell, “Notes on Nationalism,”
in Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters of George Orwell, vol. 3, pp. 361,
379 (Sonia Orwell and Ian Angus eds. 1968). The “that” was that American

24

Orwell versus Huxley

since, loosely speaking, intellectuals are in the business of
brainwashing as well as being principal targets of it.36 It is
noteworthy that Orwell got the political significance of television
backwards. He thought it a medium of surveillance (the telescreen)
and indoctrination (the “Two Minutes Hate”). It has proved to be a
medium of subversion, vastly increasing people’s access to
information about society and politics. It played a role not only in
the fall of communism but also, long before that, in the thwarting
of Lyndon Johnson’s attempt to conduct a war in Vietnam without
the informed consent of the American people.
Orwell’s most recent biographer takes the “message” of
Nineteen Eighty-Four to be that
there must be a place in the modern world for things that
have no power associated with them, things that are not
meant to advance someone’s cause, or to make someone’s
fortune, or to assert someone’s will over someone else.
There must be room, in other words, for paperweights and
fishing rods and penny sweets and leather hammers used as
children’s toys. And there must be time for wandering
among old churchyards and making the perfect cup of tea
and balancing caterpillars on a stick and falling in love. All
these things are derided as sentimental and trivial by
intellectuals who have no time for them, but they are the
things that form the real texture of a life…Readers see
Winston fail, but they also see how a whole society failed
years before “1984” when the people of that society
allowed the state to strip them systematically of their right
to be sentimental and trivial, taking away their rich
language and replacing it with an ugly, utilitarian one and
denying them the ordinary pleasures of a private life.37
troops had come to England during World War II not to fight the Germans
but to crush an English revolution.
36 The same exaggeration is visible in another notable novel about Stalinism,
Arthur Koestler’s Darkness at N o o n . See Richard A. Posner, Law and
Literature 138 (revised and enlarged ed. 1998). It is notable that Winston,
Julia, and the other targets of thought control and intimidation in Nineteen
Eighty-Four are themselves all engaged in “political work”; it is such people
who pose the largest political threat to a totalitarian regime and who therefore
must be watched most closely.
37 Michael Shelden, Orwell: The Authorized Biography 436–437 (1991).
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I find this largely unconvincing. For one thing, there is no basis in
the novel for foisting blame on “the people of that society [who]
allowed the state to strip them of their right to be sentimental and
trivial.” The origin of the totalitarian dictatorship of Oceania is not
described, and so there is no more reason to blame the people for
it than to blame the Russian people for the communist dictatorship;
Lenin seized power in a coup, and Stalin achieved absolute control
through terror. For another thing, Newspeak is a project; it has not
yet replaced standard English, even within the Party.38 Nor is there
anything to suggest that trivia and sentimentality are the keys to
freedom—Huxley thought they were the keys to a kind of slavery.
But there is something to Shelden’s belief that Orwell is trying
to tell us that if political freedom is to be preserved, “there must be
time for…falling in love.” For if you ask yourself what other “party”
of “thought controllers” disfavors sex among party members (and
the Party in Orwell’s novel is emphatic in teaching that the sole
legitimate function of sex is procreation and in discouraging sexual
pleasure39), the answer is the Roman Catholic priesthood. It is a fair
guess that one model for the Party is the Roman Catholic Church,
though a more important one is, of course, the Communist Party of
the Soviet Union, which, however, no doubt borrowed some of its
techniques from the Church.40 Orwell explicitly compares the
“adoptive” (as distinct from a hereditary) oligarchy of the Church
with that of the Party. The Church preaches love, but in its heyday
tortured and burned people. The junction is symbolized by
Orwell’s “Ministry of Love,” which is the torture and liquidation
bureau. Love the sinner, hate the sin.
One of the distinctive elements of Christianity—it is dramatized
in the Catholic practice of confession to priest—is its concern with
people’s thoughts (the confessional is a mode of surveillance,
38

I have made the same mistake as Shelden. See Posner, note 36 above, at
297.
39 Though only among the members of the Party, that is, the 15 percent of the
population that corresponds to the middle- and upper-class of a normal
society. The leaders of the Party have no interest in the morals of the proles.
40 Orwell personally was hostile to Catholicism and at times compared it to
communism, John Rodden, “George Orwell and British Catholicism,” 41
Renascence 143, 144 (1989); John P. Rossi, “Orwell and Catholicism,” 103
Commonweal 404 (1976), but I am reluctant to use a writer’s personal
opinions to interpret his imaginative writings.

26

Orwell versus Huxley

though also of absolution—and there are elements of that, too, in
Winston’s ordeal), and its placing of thought on a moral par with
action, so that adultery in the mind is a mortal sin just like adultery
in the flesh. Another name for this concern is thought
control—priests correspond to the Thought Police of Orwell’s
novel—and it is linked to hostility to sex through the fact that sexual
pleasure involves thoughts that are in the control very largely of our
animal nature rather than of a priestly caste that tells us what we
ought to be thinking about. “Not merely the love of one person,
but the animal instinct, the simple undifferentiated desire: that was
the force that would tear the Party to pieces” (p. 105). In this
respect, Nineteen Eighty-Four is the opposite of Brave New World,
where promiscuous sex is mandatory for good citizens. “Orgyporgy, Ford and fun, / Kiss the girls and make them One./ Boys at
one with girls at peace; / Orgy-porgy gives release” (p. 84).
The contrast between the two authors’ views of the political
consequences of a society’s sexual mores suggests that there may
not be a unique totalitarian “position” on sexual freedom.41
Perhaps, however, any kind of intimacy is a potential threat to a
totalitarian society, which seeks to mobilize the population for
selfless communal projects; and the issue is then what policy toward
sex discourages intimacy. The societies depicted in both novels are
hostile to the family. In Brave New World it has been abolished,
while in Nineteen Eighty-Four its abolition is one of the Party’s longterm goals, to be achieved in part by perfecting the system under
which children are encouraged to report thought crime by their
parents. The problem, so far as assigning a political valence to
sexual freedom is concerned, is that promiscuity can undermine
the family, but so can a degree of puritanism that weakens the
sexual bonding of married people. Maybe that’s why some
communes encourage free love and others celibacy, or why the
Soviet Union veered from sexual liberalism in the 1920s to
puritanism in the 1930s. Notice that if Huxley is right, the U.S.
Supreme Court is wrong to think that contraception and abortion
protect privacy viewed as a precondition of intimate relationships,
while if Orwell is right, those things do protect privacy in that sense.
But, as I say, either extreme may be inimical to intimacy.
41

See Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 239 (1992).
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I doubt the underlying premise, however—that totalitarianism
is inherently hostile to the family. The radical Islamic nations, such
as Iran, are at least quasi-totalitarian, but they are strongly profamily. They are hostile to nonmarital sex, but not to marital sex;
marriage is obligatory for Islamic clergy. A patriarchal family can
reinforce a totalitarian ethos. Hitler, Stalin, Franco, and Mussolini
were all strongly pro-family, as is the Roman Catholic Church,
despite its prohibiting sex and marriage to its clergy. The dictators
wanted to increase the birth rate and thought that encouraging
family formation was the most effective way of doing this.
Sex is rather a side issue but the idea that one is always under
surveillance, no matter how alone one thinks one is, is central to
Christianity. The Christian is under surveillance by God, and
similarly the inhabitants of Oceania by Big Brother, who, like the
Christian God, is “infallible and all-powerful… Nobody has ever
seen Big Brother. He is a face on the hoardings, a voice on the
telescreen. We may be reasonably sure that he will never die, and
there is already considerable uncertainty as to when he was born.
Big Brother is the guise in which the Party chooses to exhibit itself
to the world. His function is to act as a focusing point for love, fear,
and reverence, emotions which are more easily felt toward an
individual than toward an organization” (p. 171).
The Inquisition was merely the pathological extreme of the
Christian concern with what Orwell calls “crimethink.” O’Brien, the
Orwellian Grand Inquisitor, depicts the activities of the Ministry of
Love as the perfection of the Inquisition. “We do not destroy the
heretic because he resists us; so long as he resists us we never
destroy him. We convert him, we capture his inner mind, we
reshape him. We burn all evil and all illusion out of him; we bring
him over to our side, not in appearance, but genuinely, heart and
soul. We make him one of ourselves before we kill him… By the
time we had finished with them [three notorious traitors] they were
only the shells of men. There was nothing left in them except
sorrow for what they had done, and love for Big Brother… They
begged to be shot quickly, so that they could die while their minds
were clean” (pp. 210–211).42
42

“Orwell plays brilliantly upon traditional religious language.” Joseph
Adelson, “The Self and Memory in Nineteen Eighty-Four,” in The Future o f
Nineteen Eighty-Four 111, 116–117 (Ejner J. Jensen ed. 1984). To get the point,
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My point in bringing out the parallels between the practice of
totalitarianism in Nineteen Eighty-Four and the usages of the
Catholic Church is not to be gratuitously offensive,43 or to obscure
the role of Catholicism post-Orwell, notably in Poland, in opposing
totalitarianism, but rather to bolster my earlier statement that
brainwashing is not the story of today. Even the Catholic Church,
which I am arguing is one of the models of the “Orwellian” state,
has, though it remains immense and powerful, lost most of its
control over people’s minds, especially in the developed world.
Gone are the Inquisition and the index purgatorius. Italy has a very
high abortion rate and a very low birth rate, and even Ireland has
now legalized divorce and abortion. Free thinking among even
deeply religious people is the order of the day, not everywhere (in
particular, not in all Muslim nations), but in most quarters of the
wealthy nations and many of the nonwealthy ones as well. What
remains a subject of genuine concern for our world, but one that
neither novel casts much light on, is the juggernaut quality of
technological progress, which for reasons that I stated at the
outset—reasons that economics elucidates better than satire can,
or either of our authors—cannot be assumed to operate
automatically to the net benefit of humankind.
V. THE NOVELS AS LITERATURE
With 1984 receding into the past, and the memory of Stalinism
and Maoism already dim in our rapidly changing world—with
Orwell proved “wrong,” and Huxley “right,” or at least more right,
by history—how is one to explain the fact that Orwell’s novel is, I
believe (without having been able to obtain statistics), more
popular than Huxley’s? The part of the answer that interests me is
that Orwell’s may be the “better” novel (my use of scare quotes
just substitute “God” for “Big Brother” and “burned at the stake” for “shot” in
the passage quoted in the text.
43 The parallels have been noted before, moreover. See, for example, William
Steinhoff, George Orwell and the Origins of 1984 184–185 (1975); Jaroslav
Krejci, “Religion and Anti-Religion: Experience of a Transition,” 36
Sociological Analysis 108, 120–22 (1975). Steinhoff’s book is an exhaustive
study of the novel’s sources. I want to make clear that the Catholicism with
which I am comparing totalitarianism is traditional, not modern American,
Catholicism. On the differences, see James D. Davidson and Andrea S.
Williams, “Megatrends in 20th-century American Catholicism,” 44 Social
Compass 507 (1997).
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acknowledging the inherently subjective character of such a
judgment). As the political relevance of Nineteen Eighty-Four
recedes, its literary quality becomes more perspicuous. We can see
it better today for what it is—a wonderfully vivid, suspenseful,
atmospheric, and horrifying (in the sense, not meant pejoratively,
that much of Henry James is horrifying, even Gothic) romantic
adventure story. In places it is even a melodrama, even a boy’s
adventure story, as when the villains, O’Brien and Charrington,
recite nursery rhymes, or Charrington is seen without the disguise
that had made him look old. The scenes in Charrington’s shop bear
the stamp of The Secret Agent, while the visit of Winston and Julia
to O’Brien’s apartment for induction into the nonexistent
Brotherhood could be a scene in a John Buchan novel. The fairytale note is sounded in the very first sentence of Orwell’s novel: “It
was a bright cold day in April, and the clocks were striking thirteen”
(p. 5). We soon discover that there is nothing uncanny about a
clock’s striking 13 in Oceania, because Oceania numbers the hours
1 to 24, which is a clearer and simpler method for recording time
than the a.m.-p.m. system, just as it uses the dollar rather than the
nondecimal English currency of Orwell’s day and just as it uses the
metric system in place of English weights and measures. Yet these
simple, “rationalizing” measures turn out to be sinister in their own
right. They illustrate the Party’s effort to empty the culture of its
historical residues, to make the present discontinuous with the past.
The literary significance of the telescreen has less to do with
technology or privacy than with enhancing the perilousness of
Winston’s affair with Julia, the need for their elaborate rituals of
concealment, and the inevitability of eventual detection and
punishment. The suspense is so intense, right up to the dramatic
arrest scene, that, inevitably, the third of the book that remains is
anticlimactic. Indeed, except for the penultimate scene—the final
meeting and parting of Winston and Julia—the last third has
seemed to most readers, and seems to me, inferior to the first twothirds of the novel from a literary standpoint. The problem is not
that it is “didactic.” The most didactic portion of the book is the
long selection from The Theory and Practice of Oligarchic
Collectivism that Winston reads (to us, as it were) just before he and
Julia are arrested. The reading has enormous dramatic impact. The
problem with the last third is that it is not well crafted. The first
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post-arrest scene, with Winston in a holding cell with other political
prisoners, is intended to be horrifying but succeeds only in being
disgusting—and with the entry of Parsons, who expresses pride in
his seven-year-old daughter for her having turned him in for
thought crime, even a bit ridiculous. That is also my reaction to the
famous scene in which Winston is threatened with the rats and
screams “Do it to Julia! Do it to Julia!” (p. 236).44 The last sentence
of the book—“He [Winston] loved Big Brother” (p. 245)—also, it
seems to me, verges on the bathetic.
Oddly, given Orwell’s political aims, the last part of the book
undermines the satire of communism by making the totalitarian
dictators seem almost benign compared to O’Brien, who is a
sadistic lunatic. Hitler and Stalin were cruel and paranoid, but they
would hardly have said, or, probably, even thought, that “progress
in our world will be progress toward more pain” or that “we shall
abolish the orgasm” (p. 220).45 This is overdone to the point of
being ridiculous (though it echoes and parodies the ascetic strain in
Christianity, and so is further evidence for the link that the novel
forges between Catholicism and totalitarianism), as is O’Brien’s
insistence on teaching Winston that if the Party says that 2 + 2 = 5,
then it is so. That scene, a too deeply buried allusion to the Soviet
Union’s five-year plans,46 and so again an error of literary craft,
makes O’Brien seem more like a bullying schoolmaster trying to
drum the rules of arithmetic into the head of a slow student than
like a torturer. The basic problem is that no political purpose is
served by the elaborate cat-and-mouse game that O’Brien plays
with Winston and Julia. Neither of them either has any valuable
information about the “Brotherhood” (which probably does not
exist) or is important enough to have to be brainwashed into
making a public recantation of heresies. For remember that neither
is a member of the Inner Party, let alone an “old revolutionary”

44

The scene in which Winston confronts in the mirror the damage that
torture and starvation have done to his body is very effective, however.
45 “The worst Nazi lived on something besides cruelty.” George Kateb, “The
Road to 1984,” in Twentieth Century Interpretations of 1984 73, 75 (Samuel
Hynes ed. 1971).
46 The slogan “2 + 2 = 5” was popular in the Soviet Union during the first fiveyear plan; it expressed the aspiration of completing the plan in four years.
Steinhoff, note 38, at 172.
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(like Jones, Aaronson, and Rutherford) whose taming is important
to the Party’s image of omnipotence and infallibility.
But these are details. All I want to argue is that we can begin to
read Orwell’s novel as we read Kafka, or The Waste Land, with
which Nineteen Eighty-Four has some curious affinities, for the
vividness of its nightmare vision relieved by the occasional poignant
glimpse of redemptive possibilities. Reading it as literature (and
cognizant of its literary imperfections), we resist, as Orwell sought
to resist, the politicization of everything, the trend that has so
damaged university English departments.47 We also resist reducing
the novel to a document of the author’s biography, a common
reduction in analyses of both our novels.
In arguing for an aesthetic approach to literature and against
treating works of literature as works of moral or political
philosophy, I do not wish to be understood as advocating
acontextual readings. A rich understanding of social context is
often necessary to appreciate the wit and bite of a satire, a good
example being O’Brien’s effort to get Winston to believe that 2 + 2
= 5. But it is one thing to require an understanding of political and
other social issues as a precondition to fully appreciating a work of
literature, and another to suppose that the significance of that
work lies in its relation to those issues. The issues are not the point,
but are rather the raw material on which the literary imagination
operates to produce beauty.
Surprisingly, when we do what I am suggesting—approach
these novels as free from nonliterary preconceptions as is
possible—we discover in both of them a deep, “Romantic”
dissatisfaction with everyday modern life (“bovarism,” after
Madame Bovary). Brave New World has the more brilliant surface,
and a sparkling wit that links it to the great British comic
tradition,48 but it is not a happy book; it has no characters who
47

“‘On every campus…there is one department whose name need only be
mentioned to make people laugh’…Everyone knows that if you want to locate
the laughingstock on your local campus these days, your best bet is to stop by
the English department.” Andrew Delbanco, “The Decline and Fall of
Literature,” New York Review of Books, Nov. 4, 1999, p. 32.
48 Its funniest scene is the madcap confrontation of the Director of
Hatcheries and Conditioning by the Savage’s mother, revealing that the
Director had produced the Savage by “viviparous” reproduction, viewed as
obscene in the society of Brave New World. Of course he resigns immediately.
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engage the reader’s sympathy and no emotional depth. The
conquest by science of the tragic realities of human life as we know
it in our day is shown as destroying the possibility of romance.
Conversely, the love affair that is the emotional core of Nineteen
Eighty-Four is exalted by the proximity of terror and death. Julia is
neither beautiful nor clever, is in fact rather shallow; and Winston,
at 39, with his varicose veins, his five false teeth, his “pale and
meager body” (p. 118), is already middle-aged.49 Their
relationship—like that of Jordan and Maria in For Whom the Bell
Tolls, like that of Andrei and Natasha in War and Peace, and like
that of Julien Sorel and Madame de Rênal in The Red and t h e
Black, which seem to me the appropriate precedents in the literary
tradition50—would lack savor were it not for the background of
terror and danger and the certainty of doom. His love for Julia is
the last thing that Winston relinquishes under torture. The world of
today, made so comfortable and safe by the technology foreseen by
Huxley, has no place in it for Romanticism. The world has become
disenchanted. That Julia is rather commonplace is not, as some
feminists believe, a sign of Orwell’s alleged misogyny; it is part of the
point of the novel. (They also overlook her courage.)
From this perspective we see that the significance of the
paperweight which Winston buys in Mr. Charrington’s shop is not
as a symbol of the charm of the ordinary. It is to show how even the
most commonplace object can become luminous when it is
bracketed with danger; one is put in mind of how some people get
a greater kick out of sex when there is a risk of discovery.
A Weberian perspective can also help us see that people who
think that Nineteen Eighty-Four is “about” technology in some deep
sense are confusing technology with technocracy. Technology is the
application of rational methods to material production and
technocracy their application throughout the whole of life.51

49
50

Julia is 26 years old, so 13 years separate them—another sinister touch.
Notice that in all these pairings, including Winston-Julia, the woman is
quintessentially feminine and hence sharply differentiated from the man.
(With reference to Julia, see Leslie Tentler, “‘I’m Not Literary, Dear,’: George
Orwell on Women and the Family,” in The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four,
note 42 above, at 47, 50–51.) This is a convention of Romantic literature.
51 “‘Technocracy’…signifies a social
order organized on principles
established by technical experts.” W. H. G. Armytage, “The Rise of the
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Weber’s vision of human life become so completely rationalized
that all enchantment would be squeezed out of the world52 is
profoundly anti-Romantic and therefore profoundly dismaying to
persons of Romantic temperament.
To attribute to Orwell a Romantic fascination with the theme
of love braided with cruelty and death will seem perverse to anyone
who expects a work of imaginative literature to be continuous with
the public persona and conscious self-understanding of the author.
Orwell, as everyone knows, because he told us again and again,
stood for honesty, simple decency, plain talking, common sense,
abhorrence of cruelty, delight in the texture of ordinary life, and
the other conventional English virtues. But to write imaginative
literature one must have an imagination, and imagination draws on
the unconscious depths of a person’s mind. The author of
Nineteen Eighty-Four, who objected to the publisher’s blurb for the
book because “it makes the book sound as thought it were a thriller
mixed up with a love story,”53 was a more interesting person than
we think, and perhaps than he knew.54
I noted earlier the distinction between the actual and the
implied author of a novel. When as in the case of Orwell much is
known about the intentions of the author in writing the novel, it is
well-nigh irresistible to assume that the novel means what the
author intended it to mean. Biography overwhelms the text. If one
starts with the novel, setting aside, so far as possible, what one knows
about the author, one may find that the novel means something
Technocratic Class,” in Meaning and Control: Essays in Social Aspects o f
Science and Technology 65 (D. O. Edge and J. N. Wolfe eds. 1973).
52 The dehumanizing effects of a technocratic organization of society remains
a popular theme. See, for example, Andrew Feenberg, Alternative Modernity:
The Technical Turn in Philosophy and Social Theory (1995).
53 George Orwell, Letter to Roger Senhouse, Dec. 26, 1948, in C o l l e c t e d
Letters, Essays and Journalism of George Orwell, note 35 above, vol. 4, p. 460.
54 I have found only one previous suggestion that Nineteen Eighty-Four can be
understood as a Romantic work. W. Warren Wagar, “George Orwell as
Political Secretary of the Zeitgeist,” in The Future of Nineteen Eighty-Four,
note 42 above, at 177. Orwell’s “real allegiance was to the self, the romantic
genius picturesquely estranged from everything and everybody, who must
always be free to feel exactly what he feels and to say exactly what he pleases.”
Id. at 196. Although Professor Wagar is on to something, he spoils it for me
by denouncing Orwell as politically retrograde and expressing relief that
Orwell died in 1950, thus sparing us “his first Holy Communion at the side of
Malcolm Muggeridge.” Id.
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quite different from what the author intended to mean. One
constructs by inference an implied author, the author whose values
and intentions are latent in the novel itself; and I am suggesting that
the implied author of Nineteen Eighty-Four is a Romantic quite
different from the “real” George Orwell.55
It would be absurd to deny political, even philosophical,
significance, let alone purpose, to either novel; and that is not my
aim. (But the economics in both novels is terrible!) Huxley’s novel
is a powerful satire of utilitarianism. Orwell’s satire of communism
has lost its urgency, but his reminder of the political importance of
truth,56 of the malleability of the historical record, and of the
dependence of complex thought on a rich vocabulary (that is, that
language is a medium of thought as well as of expression) remains
both philosophically interesting,57 and timely in an era in which
history textbooks are being frantically rewritten to comply with the
dictates of political correctness. That truth shall make us free, and
that ignorance is weakness (to reverse one of the slogans of the
Party), have rarely been as powerfully shown as in Nineteen EightyFour. O’Brien is also an arresting spokesman for idealism in its zany
philosophical as opposed to its political sense, denying that there is
any reality apart from human consciousness; his program for
rewriting history (and not just history textbooks) resonates with the
long-standing philosophical debate over the epistemological
robustness of testimony.58 All these things are “in the book” in a
perfectly valid sense. And while Orwell himself was not particularly
interested in technology, it is easy to see how the recent advances in
photographic simulation and computer data manipulation would
facilitate a project of rewriting history, and it is also easy to
transform Winston’s workstation into a computer terminal in which
55
56

And of course the real George Orwell was really Eric Blair.
In the sense of factuality—truth with a lower-case t, not the Truth of
religious or political dogmatism.
57 Young, note 23 above, at 11–18; cf. Peter Carruthers, Language, Thought
and Consciousness: An Essay in Philosophical Psychology 51–52 (1996).
58 “The mutability of the past is the central tenet of Ingsoc. Past events, it is
argued, have no objective existence, but survive only in written records and in
human memories. The past is whatever the records and the memories agree
upon. And since the Party is in full control of the minds of its members [as
well as of all records], it follows that the past is whatever the Party chooses to
make it” (p. 176). Compare C.A.J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical Study
(1992).
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he edits “history” conveniently stored on line. This is legitimate
extrapolation as well.
But ultimately literature survives if at all as literature rather
than as political or philosophical or even social commentary, for in
the latter roles it is bound to be superseded sooner or later, and
usually sooner. On that basis, and that basis alone, I predict a
longer life for Nineteen Eighty-Four than for Brave New World.
Literary judgments are matters of taste, not reason, so in suggesting
that Orwell’s novel is better than Huxley’s I am simply expressing
my own preference for a literature of narrative tension and
emotional depth to one of glittering caricature. The important
point is that there is no contradiction in asserting that the novel
which (though written earlier) predicted our current situation
more accurately is the lesser work of literature.
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